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COMMENT ON DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES IN 1924
"After finding forty-eight per cent of criminal cases appealed to the State Supreme Court in the last four years have
been reversed, Robert W. Otto, Attorney General (Missouri)
declared today 80 per cent of the eases reversed were on defective instructions to the jury," says the Kansas City Star of
January 19, 1925.
Former studies of the Kentucky cases made by the writer
heretofore were so interesting that a review of the 1924 decisions in criminal cases with the idea of presenting a sort of
"box score" to check up on the "hits" and "misses"-espeeially the latter-was undertaken by him and the readers of
the Kentucky Law Journal have the benefit of it.
COMPARATVE TABEl'
1916
Number of Appeals
103
Appeals by Defendant
84
Affirmed
48
Reversed
36
Appeals by Commonwealth
19
Affirmed
9
Certifying Law
10
Homicide Appeals
Affirmed
Reversed
Liquor Appeals
Affirmed
Reversed
All other than Homicide or Liquor
Affirmed
Reversed

1917
85
76
57
19
9
4
5

1922
174
163
86
77
11
8
3
41
25
16
69
28
41
53

1924
231
220
127
93
11
7
4
47
26
21
117
70
47
56
31
25

The lofty object of the writer is the same as that expressed
when writing about the 1922 .cases.2
"Taxation, condemnation, escheat and other Commonwealth cases
of a civil nature are not included herein.
The 1924 cases included all criminal cases decided by the Court of
Appeals during 1924, although some of the opinions now appear in the
early 1925 Advance Sheets. The 1916, 1917 and 1922 cases include those
only appearing in the Advance Sheets for those respective years, regardless of when the decisions were handed down. It is believed that
the proportion is about the same.
2 In
discussing the cases herein the principles projected and the
comments interpolated are persuasive only and the idea is to challenge
the reader to investigate the adherence to or deviation from established precedents to the end that a more efficient and adequate administration of criminal justice may result. Altho the writer may be
frank or inquisitive he wishes to emphasize that he has the greatest
respect for our Honorable Court of Appeals and each and every member
thereof. See p. 117 of March, 1923, Kentucky Law Journal.
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Few, if any, of the affirmances will be referred to and many
well considered opinions will for brevity's sake be not included.
No attempt will be made to mention all of the reversed cases
nor will all of the cases mentioned be thoroughly discussedmerely the outstanding features emphasized. Many dangers
and pitfalls will thus be brought to light for the benefit of those
prosecuting or defending persons accused of crime and the
proclivities and niceties of judicial psychology and perspicacity
may be called to the attention of the general practitioner as
well as the student of law.
Errors concerning evidence were the controlling or partial
reasons for reversal in fifty-one cases. These included incompetent-evidence, insufficient-evidence and verdict-contrary-toevidence cases. Improper instructions in 38, defective indictments in 12, abuse of discretion of court in failing to sustain
motion for continuance, change of venue, 9, lack of judisdiction, 2, misconduct of Commonwealth's attorney, 2, misconduct
of juror and abuse of police power, 1 each, also contributed.
In 1922 errors in evidence and instructions contributed to 39
and 21 reversals respectively. In 1924 errors in evidence contributed to the reversal of 10 murder cases and 27 liquor cases,
instructions to 14 and 11 respectively. The search warrant hurdle is the hard one to get over. The analysis of the results
in Kentucky shows a different "proximate cause" than that in
Missouri, but it seems that evidence and instructions combined
were three times more prevalent than all other errors put together. If we are to improve our "batting averages" as judges,
prosecutors and defenders, it will be well for us to give these
two branches of the practice more careful study.
Vaughan v. Commonwealth3 reverses a life sentence on a
murder charge where the crime was perpetrated in a church
during services at a time when the victim had no warning that
he was about to be killed by being shot five or six times. The
case is reversed because the manslaughter instruction was erroneously omitted, according to the higher court. The opinion
says, "The record is barren of any proof of malice other than
There is in fact
that inferred from the homicide itself."
' 204 Ky. 229, 263 S. W. 752.
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every evidence of premeditation and it is difficult to understand why the manslaughter instruction was deemed necessary.
Chief Justice Sampson dissents in an opinion which is a gem in
its completeness, saying in part:
"Murder is abroad in the land and the more courts quibble about
the unimportant things in homicide cases, the more crimes of liker
nature will be committed and the more quibbling will be necessary.
What we need in this country as a check upon crime is a strong, wholesome administration of speedy justice, and a quick rejection of unfounded defenses which delay trials and impede the course of justice.
We give too much attention to alleged errors on appeals which have
no substance or merit."

In Menser v. Commonwealth4 a conviction is reversed because the court gave a "brought-on-the-difficulty-instruction"
which was erroneous and prejudicial. Such an instruction unless in proper form and warranted by the facts is a very dangerous one. Instructions giving undue prominence to certain
facts in Murphy v. Commonwealth,5 and thereby qualifying the
right of self-defense in Howard v. Commonwealth,5 were held
erroneous as was also a defensive instruction given in Fox v.
Commonwealth,,7 where the court erroneously refused to allow
a reargument of the case after giving an instruction on accomplices. The lower court in Fugate v. Commonwealth,8 trying
one charged with conspiracy to murder, erroneously refused to
give the conspiracy instruction because only one accused was
being then tried. Fourteen of the homicide reversals were
caused, partially at any rate, on account of improper instructions. Seven of the homicide reversals were not due in any
way to the instructions. The misconduct of the Commonwealth's
attorney in improper argument by unwarranted references
to intoxicating liquor caused the reversal of Wireman v. Commonwealth,9 and repeating. improper questions upset the convic0
tion in Foure v. Commonwealth&.
Apparently the first woman convicted under, and undoubtedly the first to appeal from conviction of violation of Ken4201

'205
6202
202
'202
'203

Ky. 607, 257 S. W. 1038.
Ky. 493, 266 S. W. 33.
Ky. 711, 216 S. W. 246.
Ky. 41, 258 S. W. 950.
Ky. 509, 260 S. W. 338.
Ky. 57, 261 S. W. 862.

10205 Ky. 62, 265 S. W. 443.
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tucky Statutes, 1155, as amended in 1922, was Phoebe Maden
Her five-year sentence was reversed 1 on account of an erroneous
instruction, the limits of punishment being fixed according to
the evidence where the boy victim was between 12 and 16
years, instead of in accordance with the charge where the boy
was alleged to be "under eighteen." Query: Will a few such
convictions tend to reform the "present double standard of
morals ' "
Gilbert v. Commonwealth12 reverses a ten-year rape conviction because evidence of intercourse with other men was not
admitted after jury had learned of prosecutrix's pregnancy.
Her pregnancy may be proven by the Commonwealth for the
purpose of corroborating her statement that appellant did have
carnal knowledge of her, the court holds, citing Druim v. Com4
holds that
monwealth,' 3 nevertheless Jordan v. Commonwealth&'
evidence as to whether prosecutrix in a seduction case became
pregnant or a child was born is not relevant or admissible to
corroborate her. Those interested in the trials of such cases
should take due notice of the admissibility of these corroborating circumstances in rape only, not in seduction.
Although defendant testified, he had not put his character
in issue and consequently questions propounded by the Commonwealth's attorney to rebuttal witness should be confined to
the accused's reputation for truth and veracity. Garten v.
Commmwealth.'5 In a murder trial, Foure v. Commonwealth,16
the court gives the proper form of question in the impeachment
of a witness as follows:
"From his general reputation for morals and for truth
and veracity, state whether or not in your opinion and judg.
ment he (the witness) is entitled to full faith and credit when
on oath." As there is no feature of evidence any more technical
than the interrogation of reputation witnesses, the active practitioner would do well to keep these cases in mind.
- 202 Ky. 782, 261 S. W. 273.
" 204 Ky. 505, 264 S. W. 1095.
124 S. W. 856.
180 Ky. 379, 202 S. W. 896.
202 Ky. 666, 261 S. W. 22.
"205 Ky. 62, 265 S. W. 442.
L. .- 3
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Although a magistrate has the power to summon witnesses before him for examination on oath concerning any publie offense (Criminal Code, section 32) nevertheless a circuit
judge cannot hold a court of inquiry. Ketcham v. Commonwealth.17 The grand jury is the inquisitorial part of the circuit court. A circuit judge who sawi enough to make a proper
affilavit before some judicial officer for the purpose of having
a search warrant issued, nevertheless cannot issue such a warrant himself without a formal affidavit. This is the holding
in Clarke v. Commonwealth."' Nor can A justice of the peace.
A trial judge in a misdemeanor case when the accused is
absent in person but present by counsel refused counsel the
privilege of entering a plea of "not guilty" in behalf of his
absent client. A judge so refusing caused the reversal of two
cases. Williams v. Commonwealth. 9
One reason why some appeals are not affirmed is that the
lower court through inadvertence or otherwise refuses to follow the directions of the upper court. "Strange the lower
court permitted the evidence . . . after both the lower court
and this court has ruled such evidence inadmissible on the first
trial. In Addington v. Commonwealth20 the court said. "Where
our rulings and directions on the first appeal are for any reason
not followed on a subsequent trial" the case will be reversed
again as was done on second appeal in homicide case of Philpot
2
v. Commonwealth. '
It is frequently heard that a party may not contradict his
22
own witness but this is not correct. Couch v. Commonwdalth,
citing many cases, correctly lays down the rule:
"A party may contradict his own witness whether (1) by other evidence, or (2) by showing that the witness has made statements different from his testimony, but in the latter case he may not be contradicted by showing inconsistent statements by him if he has only
given merely negative evidence, or has failed to make for the party
introducing him the statements apparently expected of him, but where
he states facts distinctly prejudicial to the party introducing him, or
clearly favorable to the adversary of such party, then the party inhim may properly be permitted to show by other witnesses
Ky. 168, 263 S. W. 725.
Ky. 740, 265 S. W. 280.
Ky. 790, 261 S. W. 265.
Ky. 580, 266 S. W. 250.
20205 Ky. 636, 266 S. W. 384.
2202
Ky. 677, 261 S. W. 7.

troducing
17204
11204
"1202
20205
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that such witness introduced by him had made different or Inconsistent

statements." See Civil Code, section 596, and notes; also Criminal
Code, section 221, n. 23, etc.

A motion and grounds for new trial verified by the oath of
accused must be accepted as true where Commonwealth's attorney made no effort to controvert statement therein by filing
a counter affidavit. Accused had absented himself from trial
due to misinformation from deputy sheriff and a witness. Conviction of prohibition law carrying maximum penalty was reversed. Damon v. Commonwealth.23
A diagram should not be drawn upon the floor of the court
room and referred to in the testimony, but if such diagram is
used a copy should accompany record, says Anderson v. Comnizonwealth,24 where an 18 year homicide verdict is reversed because the verdict was flagrantly against the evidence.
A second -iolation of the prohibition law wherein the punishment of the accused had been fixed at one year in the penitentiary was reversed on account of an erroneous instruction in
McKiney v. Comnonwealth.2 5 The Court of Appeals held that
the "Commonwealth must establish by evidence defendant's
guilt in the present case and his former conviction of an offense
of the same kind." A case decided January 16, 1825, however,
holds that the second conviction to warrant imposition of increased penalty need not be for the identical offense. Johnson
V. Commonwealth.26 No mention is made of the McKiney case.
The indictments in some of the cases reversed were bad for
duplicity, the several phases of the statute being embraced in
the indictments, contrary to Walker v. Commonwealth,27 and
other cases decided in 1922, which were evidently overlooked by
the draftsmen of the indictments. 'Where election is made in
time and there is no variance in the proof, convictions will be
affirmed. In one case where the Commonwealth was put on
election it elected to try for "harboring a moonshine still." As
there is no such offense, the conviction in Baker v. Commonwealth2 s was reversed.
1204 Ky. 765, 265 S. W. 33S.

21205 Ky. 369, 265 S.W. 824.
202 Ky. 757, 261 S.W. 276.
2206 Ky. 594, 268 S. W. 302.
"1193 Ky. 426, 232 S.W. 617.
"202 Ky. 181, 259 S. W. 35.

KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL

An indictment charging "drunkenness" states no offense.
It must be at a place or under circumstances as designated in
the statute. Maynard v. Comnmonwealth.29 Nor is there such
an offense as "operating a moonshine still." Potterv. Commonwealth.30 Where the Commonwealth elected to try for unlawfully manufacturing intoxicating liquors and the court erroneously instructed the jury on "operating a moonshine still" (no
such offense) a conviction was reversed in Johnson v. Commonswealth.3 ' Although the opinion endeavored to show -wherein
the substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced, the reasoning is not over convincing.
Indictments not bad for duplicity but certainly worthy of
comment for "singularity" were those for violation of the
liquor law found and returned by a grand jury which had never
been empaneled or instructed by the circuit court or any judge
of the court authorized by law to do so. The grand jury had
been instructed by the Commonwealth's attorney and among
other irregularities was the lack of signature of any judge to
the orders howing the return of the indictment. The indictments were void and bail bonds on such indictments were also
void. Consequently Meredith, et al. v. Commonwealth3 2 was
affirmed as to two forfeitures of bail bonds on two valid indictments but reversed as to nine invalid ones.
"Carrying liquor in one's stomach is not transporting
within the meaning of the prohibition act." A conviction is
reversed in Rush v. Commonwealth, 33 the verdict being flagrantly against the evidence. Officers, who saw the neck of a
bottle sticking out of a sack in an automobile but could not tell
what was in the bottle, had no right to seize the sack and its
contents which proved to be moonshine whisky, and Adkins v.
Commonwealth3 4 is reversed, the court holding the facts in this
case "very different" from "in sight" cases.
In reversing a liquor case the court said:
"From the record it appears to us that he was convicted solely be202 Ky. 684, 261 S. W. 10.
8202 Ky. 710, 261 S. W. 256.
81202 Ky. 714, 261 S. W. 255.
201 Ky. 809, 258 S. W. 686.

206 Ky. 206, 266 S. W. 1046.

' 202 Ky. 86, 259 S. W. 32.
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cause liquor was found on the adjoining premises, a pathway was
found leading from his premises to the place where the liquor was
found, and his reputation for observing ,the laws against the possession,
use and sale of intoxicating liquor was shown to be bad."

So the court held in Layer v. Commonwealth;35 this was not
enough to sustain a conviction.
"Whenever a case involves a constitutional question, either federal
or state . . . both sections hear the argument, if oral, and consider it, whether oral or written, and pass on the questions involved."
Millers' Ky. Appellate Practice, section 120, citing Rule 11.
36
Abraham v. Commonwealth; Nester v. Commonwealth&,3T
3
and Simmons v. Commonweal.t& 8 are eases involving the liquor
law in which the lower court is reversed and in which constitutional questions are discussed. Neither the Official report nor
the unofficial report shows "whole court sitting" in any of these
cases. The Simmons case reverses a one-year penitentiary sentence for second conviction and inter, alia the court says:

"It is earnestly insisted for the Commonwealth that the witness
In the performance of his duty as a peace officer in investigating the
unusual noise which he heard, had a legal right under the circumstances to enter the building through the open door and to knock upon
the door of appellant's room; that this being true, the fact that the
door came open when he knocked upon it, thus disclosing appellant in
the possession of moonshine whiskey, was not the result of an illegal
act upon the part of the witness. With this we cannot agree."
The writer in an article in the March, 1923, Kentucky Law
Journal (p. 124) commented on the case of Youman v. Caminonwealth,39 holding articles obtained by search without a warrant inadmissible in evidence. A constitutional question was
involved and the writer expressed the presumption that the
whole court sat although the official report was silent as to specific mention of it. The fact that there was no dissenting opinion was at that time referred to. The writer cited and quoted
numerous texts and opinions at length which caused him to
reach the conclusion that the Youman decision was unsound.
This is the case, the reasoning of which, Dean John H. Wiginore,
- 204 Ky. 510, 264 S. W. 1097.
H

202 Ky. 491, 260 S. W. 18.

-202 Ky. 748, 261 S. W. 270.

31203 Ky. 621. 262 S. W. 972.
189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860, 13 A. L. R. 1303.
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the "great

American Greenleaf,"

denominated "misguided

sentimentality. "

A "dugout" illicit stillhouse, located at a place on appellant's farm, a quarter of a mile from the dwelling, was held to
be a "house" within section 10, Kentucky Constitution, relating to searches and seizures in Morse v. Commonwealth.40 A
conviction was thereby reversed. The whole court sat, Chief
Judge Sampson and Judge McCandless dissenting. The latter,
in a minority opinion which is a classic, pays his respects to the
Youman decision and to the "drastic" majority opinion in the
Morse case. In fifteen pages of the official report he reviews
the precedents, harking back as far as 1637, citing some, but
in a large measure augmenting the authorities collated in the
Kentucky Law Journal, supra, and after exhaustive research,
says: "So far as my observation extends, in all the history of
the common law no instance can be found in which, if otherwise
competent, evidence was excluded because illegally obtained."
He cogently answers the alleged Youman logic as follows:
"The Fourth Amendment -is a guaranty of sacred rights, not a rule
of evidence. Its object and purpose is to protect society, not to free
criminals. It denounces the acts of unreasonable search and seizure,
but provides no penalties or methods of enforcement."
"For its violation, however, the wronged person, whether good or
bad, may have his action for the trespass and also prosecute the offender at common law. To grant immunity to a criminal whose guilt
is uncovered by the search, a remedy that may -not be invoked by the
innocent, ds to favor the criminal and in effect to place a premium on
crime."
"Certainly there is nothing in the language of 'the provision that
either expressly or impliedly authorized such a construction, and in
adopting 'the rule, it seems to me, the court places itself in a very embarrassing attitude. The acts denounced are the unlawful invasion of
the rights of privacy; the act is complete when the search or seizure
is made, and should not be confused with the subsequent use of the
evidence thereby seized."

The paragraphs of the Youman decision ending " . . . the
.
. .
are more interested in the preservation of fundamental principles than they are in the punishment of some petty offender," are quoted and Judge MeCandless
says:

law-abiding public

"If Instead of intoxicating liquor the officers had found In Youman's residence the mutilated body of a murdered man, together with
sufficient evidence to fix the crime of murder upon Youman, would the
40204

Ky. 672, 265 S. W. 37.

COmmENTS ON DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES IN 1924

133

same conclusion have been reached? Could the same patriotic sentiments have been so eloquently expressed?"

He reaches the conclusion that the Youman "rule is not
based upon a sound premise and will not stand the test of time."
After "listening in" for so long a time and having been
distracted by so much "static" in the way of "coddling the criminal classes" by excluding competent incriminating evidence,
it is certainly gratifying to receive the ringing tones of Judge
McCandless' perfect "broadcasting."
Considerable of the virility was emasculated from the
Youman doctrine, or it might be more appropriate to say that
a great deal of its "wetness" was "dried up" by the affirmance
of Kendall v. Commonwealth.4 1 From the opinion we quote:
"While we have held in a number of cases that a public
officer charged with the enforcement of the prohibition laws may
not as a witness give evidence against a defendant which was
obtained by unlawful means, as by trespassing upon the premises of the accused, we have never extended this rule to evidence given by private citizens. The testimony of Uloth was
competent against appellant although it would not have been
had he acted in an official capacity." .
"Whatever one may think of his conduct in spying upon
the premises of another, he was not disqualified as a witness
by such act. The case of Mattingly v. Commonwealth,4 2 upon
which appellant relies, does not announce a contrary rule, for
in that case the trespassers were pnblic officials engaged in
attempting to enforce the prohibition laws."
The case of Chapman v. Commonwealth4 3 is to the same
effect. It says: "Nor can the fact that a private individual
assumes to be a public officer, or assumes to act under a search
warrant, change his status so as to affect the competency of the
evidence so disclosed.
Thus we see our court has reached the conclusion that the
wilful unlawful acts of a private citizen are of more competent
and convincing evidential effect than those of an officer acting
"202 Ky. 169, 259 S. W. 71.
"197 Ky. 583, 247 S. W. 938.
206 Ky. 439, 267 S. W. 181.
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conscientiously, but not clothed with every technical vestige
required by those who apparently prefer to see two guilty
escape rather than that one be punished. Maybe some day when
the Wigmore logic" and the Harno reasoning 45 have completely
sunk in, the iniquitous Youman doctrine will be superseded in
its entirety.
The forfeiture of a whole farm of 155 acres under Acts of
1922, chapter 33, section 13, because intoxicating liquors had
been manufactured thereon was reversed in Rickman v. Cornmranwealth, 46 the Court of Appeals holding that the forfeiture
of the entire farm "would be to carry the police power further
than necessary to abate the nuisance and that only that part
of the premises which is so used should be forfeited." Although
the opinion by Commissioner Hobson states that the court considered the question "in full bench" there is no statement at
the end of the opinion "whole court sitting." The then Chief
Justice (Sampson), however, delivered an able dissenting opinion, 47 in which he states, "It seems impossible to give the act any
effect witbout giving it its full effect." He quotes, in haec verba,
the concluding portion of section 13 reading as follows:
"The forfeiture herein provided for shall extend to the whole of the
farm, premises, building or structure owned by defendant or to such
thereof as he has any interest in, including all land and all buildings
in one boundary, and shall not be construed to mean a part thereof."

He reiterates the language "shall not be construed to mean
a part thereof" and says "had each member of the House of
Representatives and the whole body of the Senate attempted to
make it more definite and certain that the whole of a farm was
to be sold-in case of forfeiture and not a part thereof, more apt
words could not have been employed than those copied above."
In providing for the forfeiture of the whole of any such farm
and not a part thereof the Legislature made it as emphatic as
if it had said in the slang of the day, "And I don't mean
maybe."
The then Chief Justice says: "Whether such act should be
"Aug. 1922, American Bar Association Journal, pp. 479, et seq.
Law Review, pp. 303.
"19 Ill.
0204 Ky. 848, 265 S. W. 452.
4265 S. W. 609.
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passed addressed itself to the legislative will. With that the
courts have nothing to do.."
"I apprehend that there
will be great difficulty under the rule laid down in the majority
opinion in determining with exactness how much of a given
farm on which an illicit still is found shall be subject to forfeiture."
"Shall the court be permitted to say that
the forfeiture would work'too great a hardship'?"
"I
think the court invaded a legislative province when it struck
from the forfeiture act the whole of the clause declaring that
forfeitures shall extend to the whole of a farm, including all the
land in one boundary, and shall not be construed to mean a part
thereof." (The italics used in discussing the Rickman case are
Judge Sampson's.)
When the learned Chief Justice iA so impressed by the majority opinion would it be at all surprising if the ordinary lay
mind should reach the conclusion that the highest court of the
state has engaged in unwarranted judicial repeal of valid legislation ?
JOHN JUNIOR HOWE,

Commonwealth's Attorney.
Carrollton, Ky.

